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Abstract 
While in many African countries, open unemployment is largely confined to urban 
areas and thus overall rates are quite low, in South Africa (and a few other Southern 
African countries), open unemployment rates hover around 30%, with rural 
unemployment rates being even higher than that.  This occurs despite the near 
complete absence of an unemployment insurance system and little labour market 
regulation that applies to rural labour markets.  This paper examines how 
unemployment can persist without support from unemployment compensation.   
Analysing household surveys from 1993, 1995, and 1998, we find that the household 
formation response of the unemployed is the critical way in which the unemployed 
assure access to resources.  In particular, unemployment delays the setting up of an 
individual household by young persons, in some cases by decades.  It also leads to 
the dissolution of existing households and a return of constituent members to parents 
and other relatives and friends.  Access to state transfers (in particular, non-
contributory old age pensions) increases the likelihood of attracting unemployed 
persons to a household.  Some unemployed do not benefit from this safety net, and the 
presence of unemployed members pulls many households supporting them into 
poverty.  We also show that the household formation response draw some of the 
unemployed away from employment opportunities, and thus lowers their employment 
prospects.   
1. Introduction  
Rigid labour markets, high statutory (or union-negotiated) minimum wages and 
generous, long-lasting unemployment benefits are often claimed to be important 
factors causing high unemployment rates in Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries as well as developing countries (for example, 
World Bank, 1995; OECD, 1994; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).  As   1
far as African countries are concerned, these arguments usually focus on urban labour 
markets, where open unemployment is a serious problem in many countries (ILO, 
2005). 
In light of this literature, this paper examines the unemployment experience of South 
Africa, a country with one of the highest reported unemployment rates in the world.  
Using a ‘narrow’ definition of unemployment (including only those who are willing 
to work and actively searching), South Africa had an unemployment rate of 28% in 
2004; using a ‘broad’ definition (which includes those who are willing to work but 
are not searching), the unemployment rate stood at about 41% (see Table 1).
1 These 
rates are at the very high end of developing countries overall and, together with 
similarly high open unemployment rates in some neighbouring countries (for 
example, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Zambia), by far the highest measured 
open unemployment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1995; ILO, 2005).
2  
Moreover, high unemployment coexists with comparatively low levels of labour 
force participation.  Only 56% of the working age population are active labour market 
participants, in comparison with a participation rate of 75% for middle-income 
countries as a whole (World Bank, 2003).  Consequently, only 40% of the working 
age population are actually working and this figure drops to 16% among the poor.  As 
documented in detail by Klasen and Woolard (1999), these high rates of open 
unemployment are only to a very small extent due to underreporting of informal 
sector or agricultural activities or to other issues of undercounting employment or 
overstating unemployment.
3    
While urban unemployment rates are already very high, the even higher rural 
unemployment rates (particularly in the former ‘homelands’) are striking as 
unemployment rates in rural areas of developing countries tend to be much lower 
                                                           
1 There is some discussion as to what is the appropriate unemployment rate to use for analyses of 
the labour market.  Kingdon and Knight (1999) argues that the ‘broad’ unemployment rate is the 
appropriate one, while others believe that the ‘narrow’ unemployment rate tracks the performance 
of the labour market more reliably.  For a discussion, see Stats SA (1996), Klasen and Woolard 
(1999, 2000). Including involuntary part-time employed would add another 2% to the 
unemployment rate.   
2 Reliable unemployment statistics for Sub Saharan African countries are sparse.  The countries 
included in the ILO labour statistics database (13 countries, see ILO 2005) generally show open 
unemployment rates of between 1-10% in most countries in West, Central or East Africa.  In 
Southern Africa, open unemployment rates are considerably higher, ranging from 12% in Zambia to 
about 33% in Namibia and 40% in Lesotho.    
3 While there have been some questions about the reliability of some of these figures (for example, 
ILO, 1996; Schlemmer, 1996), these unusually high unemployment rates  have been confirmed 
through the consistency between the unemployment rates measured in five consecutive household 
surveys and the general consistency with employment statistics, labour force participation data, 
various methodologies to capture the informal economy and to elicit information about the 
activities and means of support of the unemployed.  See Klasen and Woolard (1999, 2000) for 
further details.     2
than in urban areas (Todaro and Smith, 2003; World Bank, 1995).
4  As illustrated in 
Figure 1, unemployment differs greatly by race and age.  Africans have much higher 
unemployment rates and the young of all races are disproportionately affected by 
unemployment.  The broad unemployment rate for young Africans stood at over 60% 
in 2004, compared to about 3% for older whites.
5   
Table 1 Unemployment rates, by location 





















































































Source: Saldru (1993), Stats SA (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004).  It should be noted that the figures are not 
entirely comparable over time, for reasons explained in Klasen and Woolard (1999, 2000) and Business Trust (2004), 
but they present the correct orders of magnitude.   
                                                           
4 Those rates exceed, for example, the most careful accounting of unemployment and 
underemployment in rural areas in India by a considerable margin (Bardhan, 1978, see also Fallon 
and Lucas, 1997). 
5 Throughout the paper, we use the currently used descriptions of population groups in South 
Africa.  We refer to black South Africans as Africans, people of mixed-race origin as Coloureds, 
people of Indian and other Asian origin as Indians, and people of European descent as Whites.  
There is also a noticeable gender differential with females suffering from higher unemployment 
rates among each age and race group.       3





































Source: Stats SA (2004). 
These high unemployment rates constitute a puzzle and challenge for the above 
mentioned literature in two respects.  First, how do the unemployed sustain 
themselves in a country where only about 3% of the unemployed are receiving 
unemployment support at any one point in time?
6  Second, while it may be the case 
that urban unemployment rates are related to adverse macroeconomic shocks, the 
legacy of apartheid-era distortions, and high and possibly growing labour market 
rigidities (for example, Fallon and Lucas, 1997), how can it be that unemployment is 
so high in rural areas where there exists almost no enforced labour regulations 
(Labour Market Commission, 1996), and where wages could (presumably) freely 
adjust to equilibrate labour demand and supply? 
This paper investigates these questions and shows that the unemployed respond to 
their plight by attaching themselves to households with adequate means of private or 
public support to ensure access to basic means of survival.  These location decisions 
often lead the unemployed to stay in, or move to, rural areas where the nature of 
                                                           
6 The SALDRU (SALDRU, 1993) survey finds that about 2.5% of households containing 
unemployed people are receiving unemployment support (it does not attribute this income to a 
specific person within the household).  ILO (1996) suggests that about 600,000 (or about 12% of 
the unemployed) received some unemployment support over the course of the year 1992.  The two 
figures can be reconciled, knowing that the maximum amount of time the UIF pays out is 26 weeks, 
and recognising that the actual pay-out time is often much shorter (for workers with short 
unemployment spells or those who do not qualify for the full 26 weeks owing to an insufficient 
prior work history).   4
economic support tends to be better which can thus partly account for the high rural 
unemployment rates.  At the same time, these household formation decisions leave 
most of the unemployed and the households supporting them mired in deep poverty, 
with some unemployed persons facing destitution.  In addition, these coping 
strategies appear to negatively influence search and employment prospects as the 
location of economic support is often far away from promising labour market 
opportunities. 
These findings suggest that the existing private safety net provides some means of 
sustenance for the unemployed, but does so very unequally and inefficiently in the 
sense that it may be responsible for creating regional immobility of the unemployed.  
As we discuss below, this may therefore call for innovative solutions for the design of 
safety nets and other policies to improve the employment prospects of the 
unemployed (see also Klasen and Woolard, 1998).  The findings of the paper are of 
relevance also to debates about unemployment support and social policy in OECD 
countries (for example, OECD, 1998; Murray, 1984; Atkinson, 1999; Agell, 1999; 
Ellwood and Bane, 1985, Moffitt, 1992; Atkinson and Mickleright, 1991; Gregg and 
Wadsworth, 1996).  As a natural experiment of a country with only negligible access 
to unemployment insurance, it sheds some light on the consequences of the lack of 
such a support system on incentives and employment prospects of the unemployed as 
well as their welfare and the welfare of those who support them.  Lastly, these 
findings may also contribute to debates about Southern European patterns of 
unemployment, particularly among the young, where lack of public support for the 
unemployed young also appears to lead to marked changes in the household 
formation patterns of the unemployed (namely, a long delay in leaving the parental 
home, deferred marriage and child-bearing) and appears to contribute to locational 
rigidities in the labour market (Gallie and Paugam, 2000; Bentolila and Ichino, 
2000).
7   
This paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the relevant literature on 
unemployment and household formation while section 3 provides some background 
to South Africa and the data used.  Section 4 examines descriptive statistics, section 5 
specifies a multinominal logit model relating employment status to household 
formation, and section 6 investigates the consequences of these household formation 
decisions on incentives to search and on the welfare of households hosting 
unemployed members.  Section 7 concludes with policy implications for South Africa 
and discusses the incentive and welfare effects of various unemployment policies. 
                                                           
7 See also a related discussion about the adaptation of North American youth to changes in 
economic circumstances in Card and Lemieux (2000).   5
2. Unemployment and Household Formation: 
Literature and Framework 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the South African case, it may be 
useful to briefly consider the existing literature on unemployment and household 
formation and present a simple theoretical framework for the ensuing discussion.    
While most of the macro empirical literature has focused on the role of labour market 
institutions and rigidities to explain unemployment (for example, Blanchard and 
Wolfers, 2000; World Bank, 1995; see Kingdon and Knight, 2004 for South Africa), 
most of the micro empirical literature on the causes of persistent unemployment has 
focused on incentives of the unemployed individual (for example, Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1991; Mortenson, 1977; Steiner, 1997).  More recently, the impact of 
the household on unemployment has been considered in two ways.  Firstly, 
household resources of other members of the household have been included in 
analyses of incentive effects (mainly in analyses focusing on OECD countries).   
These studies found that the availability of other household resources may also raise 
reservation wages and thus prolong search and unemployment durations although the 
size of the effects is a matter of some debate (for example, Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1991; Arulampulam and Stewart, 1995).  Secondly, the distribution of 
unemployment across households has recently received some attention in the 
literature examining employment and unemployment polarisation and thus the 
welfare consequences of unemployment (for example, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; 
OECD, 1998).  While both literatures enrich the debates about unemployment, they 
tend to treat the household as exogenous although several studies mention the 
possibility that household formation may be a result rather than a cause of labour 
market outcomes (OECD, 1998; Bentolila and Ichino, 2000).  At the same time, there 
exists a theoretical and econometric literature that examines the determinants of 
household formation and transfers between households that can shed some light on 
the questions examined here.  McElroy (1985) considers a Nash-bargaining model of 
family behaviour that jointly determines work, consumption, and household 
membership, in particular the decision whether a young male resides with his parents 
or on his own.  In this model, the location decision of the youth (alone or with 
parents) as well as his labour supply decisions are considered jointly and she finds 
that parents insure their sons against poor labour market opportunities.  While 
drawing from insights of these models, we deviate from this framework as we take 
the employment situation as exogenous and then consider the optimal residential 
decision as a result. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993, 1994) study the resource allocation of parents in the 
US towards their children in the form of transfers and co-residence.  They also 
consider the impact of own earnings of the children, public transfers and fertility   6
decisions of their children on these resource allocations.  They find that there is some 
limited trade-off between parental and government aid to children and that 
unemployment significantly increases the chance of staying with one’s parents or 
receiving a transfer.
8  While using some insights from these models, we focus on the 
location decision of the individual rather than his/her parents.  Moreover, we broaden 
the analysis to consider not only parents but other relatives or even non-relatives as 
potential “receiving” households, while we limit the analysis to residence decisions 
because inter-household transfers to support an unemployed relative play a negligible 
role on the South African context.
9  
Finally, there is a literature on household formation.  Börsch-Supan (1986) finds that 
housing prices significantly influence the formation of households.  Ermish and Di 
Salvo (1997) find that own income increases household formation, parental income 
reduces it, and unemployment also serves to reduce household formation of young 
people in Britain.
10 
There is also some literature that relates to household formation in South Africa. In 
particular, Edmonds et al. (2001) find evidence that the presence of an old-age 
pensioner alters the household composition of the household housing that pensioner, 
with important gender differences.  Secondly, Bertrand et al. (2003) find that the 
presence of an old-age pensioner is correlated with a reduction in labor supply of 
prime-age individuals in that household.
11  Both studies highlight important aspects 
that will be examined here, namely the endogeneity of household composition, and 
the incentive effects of public income sources on labor market behavior.  But neither 
study focuses on linking these issues to explaining high unemployment, particularly 
in rural areas.      
                                                           
8Another literature closely related to the topic investigated here deals with the household formation 
and dissolution decisions associated with welfare in the USA.  In this well-known debate, Murray 
(1984) and others charged that Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was splitting up 
families by penalising two-parent families.  Ellwood and Bane (1985) and Ellwood and Summers 
(1986) suggested instead that more generous welfare payments were having minimal effects on 
marriage, divorce or birth rates, but their main effect is to allow single mothers with children to 
form their own households instead of forcing them to live with their parents.  They suggest that in a 
world without welfare, many single-mothers would be forced to live with their parents, and many 
others would be extremely poor, while the incidence of single motherhood or illegitimacy would be 
less affected. 
9 Remittances do play a significant role in South Africa, but usually in the form of a working single 
individual remitting funds to his/her family, but not a family sending resources to support an 
unemployed individual (see May 1996; May et al. 1997).   
10 In contrast, Richards et al. (1987) find that higher income of the parental household increases the 
likelihood of the children living alone and the labour force data do not significantly influence the 
nature of transitions from household types in the US. 
11 These findings have been questioned by Posel et al. (2004) who argue that once absent (that is, 
migrating) household members are considered in the analysis, the results change considerably.     7
Using insights from this literature, we consider the following framework for the 
empirical analysis.  While at least in the medium term, both the labour market 
situation as well as the household formation decision is jointly determined, we focus 
most of our analysis on the situation, where we take the labour market situation as 
given and consider the residential decision of the individual.
12  In particular, we want 
to consider the decision of forming one’s own household versus remaining in the 
household of parents, or attaching oneself to relatives or friends.  The individual is 
assumed to maximise a utility function subject to a budget constraint that considers 
the incomes available to that individual in the various possible household 
arrangements.  If the decision is to live on one’s own, the arguments in the utility 
function include only wages, non-wage incomes, and prices, which are likely to 
depend on location, while other considerations are added when the individual is 
attached to another household.  They include a privacy cost to being attached to 
another household which presumably rises with age, education, and being married 
(see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993, 1994), but include the additional benefit of 
getting access to a share of the incomes of the household to which one is attached.  In 
addition, one benefits from sharing the economies of scale of being in a larger 
household.  For example, we can simply assume that the share each person can get 
access to is proportional to the scale-adjusted household income per capita.
13  A  
further cost to being attached to another household may be that one is thereby bound 
by the location of that household and may therefore face reduced labour market 
opportunities if the household is in a region where there is little demand for the 
labour the individual provides.   
Thus the framework we are considering is the comparison between the indirect utility 
functions of living on one’s own and being attached to another household: 
V (alone)  =  f  (w, p, I) 
       +  -  + 
V(attached) = g (w, p, I, cp(age, education) δPr(w), Y/n
θ) 
       +   -   +      -          -                -           +          
where w is the wage rate (zero in the case of unemployment), p prices, I non-wage 
income, cp refers to the privacy cost which is assumed to rise with age and 
                                                           
12 Given the large unemployment rates, particularly among the young who are facing the decision of 
staying or leaving a household, we believe that this is a reasonably approximation.  See also Case 
and Deaton (1998).  We will, however, consider the impact of household location of the 
unemployed on the decision to search or not.   
13 We model this simply as the combined incomes of everyone else in the household divided by the 
scale-adjusted household size (the number of household members to the power 0.6; the results are, 
however, not sensitive to the choice of the exponent).  There is a question whether this variable is 
endogenous, so we will also consider specifications where we drop this variable (whose size and 
significance is not of substantive interest in this paper) to see whether it changes our results.     8
education
14,  δPr(w) refers to the discounted expected value of lost wages due to 
attaching oneself to a household where employment prospects are scarce, Y/n
θ is the 
scale-adjusted per capita income of the other members of the household one is 
attached to (which can include market and public incomes).  Being employed and 
earning higher wages should increase the likelihood of living on one’s own as it 
becomes relatively more attractive to avoid the privacy costs, while the benefits of 
being attached to another household are comparatively smaller.
15  Conversely, being 
unemployed should reduce the attractiveness of living alone because in this situation, 
the access to income from other household members looms larger in the calculation 
of relative benefits.  Being older and married should also reduce the likelihood of 
being attached, while higher (scale adjusted) per capita incomes of the receiving 
household should increase the likelihood of being attached.  Finally, the costs of 
being attached to a household in a poor labour market should matter less for 
unemployed people who already face poor labour market opportunities as their 
forgone earnings are comparatively smaller.   
This very simple framework should allow us to study how the unemployed in South 
Africa cope with their fate which is examined in more detail in the next three 
sections.   
3. Background and Data 
It may be useful to briefly summarise some key features of the South African 
economy and labour market. South Africa is a middle income country whose 
economy depends to a considerable extent on mining and mineral activities, a 
sizeable manufacturing sector serving the domestic and regional markets (about 20% 
of total employment), a large service sector (including a large governmental sector), a 
comparatively small, capital-intensive, commercialised agricultural sector and a very 
low-productivity, small-scale subsistence agricultural sector in the former homelands 
(with all of agriculture producing about 5% of gross domestic product and absorbing 
some 10% of employment).  The apartheid system in place until the transition to 
black majority rule in the early 1990s had profound effects on the economy and the 
labour market including:
16 
                                                           
14 This privacy cost could additionally be related to marital status.  But since marital status is 
usually endogenous (many people combine leaving home with marriage), we do not include it as a 
separate exogenous variable.  In sensitivity analyses, we have included it as a separate variable (see 
below).        
15 Moreover, one would realistically assume that a person earning a wage will get fewer resources 
from others in the household than before (and might even have to transfer some of the earnings to 
others).     
16 See Lundahl (1991), Fallon (1993), Fallon and Lucas (1997), Kingdon and Knight (2004), and   9
•  discriminatory access to employment in the formal labour market with whites 
being favoured by better education systems, job reservation policies, and 
residential and workplace restrictions (pass laws); 
•  an increasing capital-intensity of production in all sectors of the economy, 
promoted by an increasing shortage of skilled labour, subsidies on capital, and 
attempts by the apartheid state to lessen the dependence of the ‘white’ 
economy on unskilled African labour; 
•  restrictions on the movement of Africans (through pass laws and restrictions on 
housing and urban amenities) forcing the majority of Africans into the 
homelands; this also contributed to the splitting up of households where 
working-age members would be allowed to live and work in the cities of white 
RSA and their dependants would be forced to reside in the homelands and be 
dependent on remittances;   
•  several legislative measures to eliminate the previously widespread practise of 
share-cropping, and ‘squatting’ of Africans on white-owned land
17;  and 
•  prohibitions and restrictions on formal and informal economic activities by 
Africans, especially for those residing in non-homeland South Africa.   
Partly as a result of the inefficiencies and distortions generated by some of the above 
policies, per capita growth declined dramatically from 5% in the 1960s to 2% in the 
1980s and less than that in the 1990s.  Employment growth fell to 0.7% in the 1980s 
and turned negative in the 1990s.
18 
With the labour force growing at about 2.5% per year, low employment growth 
ensured that unemployment increased very rapidly in the 1980s and, by the 1990s 
reached the levels observed in Table 1.  Moreover, the apartheid legacy (especially 
with regards to education and the labour market) is responsible for the fact that 
unemployment, employment, and earnings continue to differ greatly by race which is 
a more important predictor of employment prospects and wages than any other factor 
(including age, gender, education, experience, or location, see  Klasen, 2002, and 
Fallon and Lucas, 1997). 
19  The decline in job creation in the 1980s and 1990s also 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
ILO (1996) for details. 
17 Squatting was an arrangement where Africans rented a portion of the land (or sometimes, the 
entire farm was rented out in this way) and paid a fixed rent for doing so.  For a discussion see 
Wilson (1971). 
18 Some observers have also pointed to increasing capital intensity, rising union wage premia, and a 
number of external shocks (falling gold prices and financial sanctions) as further factors causing the 
slowdown in employment growth in the 1980s (for example, Fallon and Lucas, 1997). 
19 This predominance of race as a factor 10 years after the end of all statutory racial discrimination 
in the labour market (influx controls, job reservations, and colour bars were lifted in the 1980s), is 
mostly related to vastly different quality of education (Case and Deaton, 1996b), the continued 
impact of past discrimination in the labour market which still has a powerful influence on the shape 
of the existing labour force, some persisting discrimination in the labour market (likely to have 
persisted until the early 1990s at least), and the absence of any significant job creation which could 
have hastened a change in the racial composition of the labour force.  See also Klasen (2002).   10
led the steep age profile of unemployment as shown in Figure 1 (Klasen and 
Woolard, 1999, 2000; Kingdon and Knight, 2004).   Apartheid policies are also 
largely responsible for the uneven population distribution of Africans, many of whom 
(including most of the elderly) are still crowded in the predominantly rural areas of 
the former homelands.   
Finally, despite the lack of a system of unemployment support or other safety nets 
targeted at the unemployed, the one source of social security in South Africa comes 
in the form of fairly generous non-contributory means-tested old-age pensions (Case 
and Deaton, 1998, Ardington and Lund, 1995).  Since many of the elderly live in 
rural areas, particularly in the former homelands, these pensions support many 
households in those areas, a subject examined in greater detail below.     
The data used for the analysis are drawn from two cross-sectional household surveys 
and one re-survey of a share of the households in one of the surveys.  For 1993, the 
data are drawn from the SALDRU survey, which is similar to conventional Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys that are conducted with support of the World Bank 
in many developing countries.  It covered 9000 households (in 360 clusters), and 
included detailed questions on incomes and expenditures, including modules on 
informal and subsistence activities.   
For 1995, we rely on the October Household Survey (OHS) covering 30  000 
households (in 3000 clusters
20) and focused on labour market and informal sector 
activities.  It has the added advantage that it included an Income and Expenditure 
Survey which included 98% of the households covered by the OHS, thereby allowing 
a careful analysis of incomes and expenditures as well.
21  
In order to learn more about the dynamics of household formation and its interaction 
with labour market trends, we also examine the 1998 KwaZulu Income Dynamics 
Survey (KIDS) which re-surveyed all households included in the 1993 SALDRU 
survey in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’s most populous province.
22   
 
                                                           
20 The impact on standard errors in a clustered sample of this nature is taken into account in the 
econometric results.  For details, see Deaton (1997).   
21 Despite small differences in sampling and questionnaire design, Klasen and Woolard (1999) find 
that the two surveys are broadly compatible and yield results consistent with other sources of 
employment data, such that they present a coherent and consistent picture on the state and 
determinants of employment and unemployment in South Africa. 
22 For details on this re-survey, refer to May et al. (2000).      11
4. Descriptive Statistics 
To motivate the econometric analysis, this section provides some descriptive statistics 
on how the unemployed are able to get access to resources despite the near absence of 
unemployment insurance.
23  This can be done using a person-level and household-
level analysis.  The former investigates the types of households in which unemployed 
individuals live; the latter asks what share of households contain various 
combinations of employed, unemployed, and inactive (out of the labour force) 
individuals.   
The person-level analysis is shown in Table 2.  It shows that about 60% of the 
unemployed live in households where someone is employed; 20% of the unemployed 
live in households which receive remittances from an absent household member.     
This is largely related to the migrant labour system created by apartheid era 
restrictions on movements.  Thus, about 80% of the unemployed are able to depend 
on labour income from a present (or absent) household member, and only 20% of all 
unemployed (or about 0.8 million) live in households with no connection to the 
labour market whatsoever.  This is a very small share indeed, certainly when 
compared to industrialised countries where more than 50% of the unemployed live in 
households where no one else is employed (OECD, 1998). Among rural Africans (the 
largest group among the unemployed), the relations are similar, although a greater 
share relies on remittances, and fewer on employment income in the household. 
Table 2: Labour Market Connections of Unemployed Individuals (‘000) 
  All Unemployed  Rural African Unemployed 
 Number Share Number  Share
No one employed, no remittances  835 20.2 655  21.4
No one employed, remittances  878 21.3 783  25.6
1 employed  1,557 37.7 1,063  34.7
2-3 employed  792 19.2 502  16.4
4+ employed  69 1.7 58  1.9
Total 4,130 100 3,061  100
Source: Saldru (1993). 
Table 3 examines the distribution of employed and unemployed within households.  
With high unemployment rates such as those prevailing in South Africa, we would 
expect a high proportion of households with no connection to the labour market, but 
this is not the case.  Table 3 shows that the vast majority of households (70%) contain 
no unemployed person.  Given the racial differences in unemployment rates (Figure 
1) and the near absence of interracial households, most white and Indian, and a large 
share of Coloured households are among this group of households with no 
                                                           
23 See ILO (1996) and Fallon and Lucas (1997) for a similar, but somewhat more cursory analysis.   12
unemployed. Twenty % of households contain one unemployed person; very few 
contain more than 3 unemployed. In 15% of households, no one is employed, but 
they do receive remittances.  At the same time, 13% of households do not receive 
remittances and contain no one who is employed.  Thus these households have no 
connection to the labour market. This is again much lower than in OECD countries.
24 
Table  3:  The Number of Employed and Unemployed among Adults in 
Households (%) 
  Number of Unemployed   
Number of Employed  0 1 2-3  4+  Total 
0, no remittances  7.1  3.2  2.1  0.3  12.6 
0, remittances  8.3  4.3  2.1  0.1  14.8 
1 31.6  2.6  2.9  0.4  43.8 
2-3 22.0  3.4  1.6  0.3  27.3 
4+ 1.1  1.0  0.1  0.1  1.5 
Total  70.0 19.9 8.9 1.2 100.0 
Source: Saldru (1993). 
The two analyses together imply that employment and unemployment are widely 
distributed across households, certainly much more widely than in rich countries.  In 
the South African context, this is particularly surprising given that, due to racial 
differences in unemployment, white households (and, to a lesser extent, Indian 
households) are largely insulated from the burden of unemployment.  This implies 
that among African households, the burden of unemployment is particularly widely 
dispersed, with many households containing one unemployed person, and quite a few 
more than one.  In the next section, we will examine how this wide dispersion of 
unemployment is achieved through shifts in household composition.  At this stage, it 
suffices to note that the vast majority of the unemployed and the vast majority of 
households containing unemployed persons have access to labour income which thus 
provides an important private safety net.  At the same time, this private safety net 
does not cover everyone and leaves some 20% of the unemployed and some 12% of 
households without access to labour income.   
What do the households without access to labour income live off? Some 25% of the 
1.1 million households with no connection to the labour market
25consist 
                                                           
24 In OECD countries, the average unemployment rate stood at 7.6% in 1996; yet 18% of all 
households which included a working age person contained no one who is employed.  In contrast to 
South Africa, a much higher jobless rate produces a much lower rate of jobless households.  This 
comparison understates the difference as the South African figure includes pensioners living alone 
where we would not expect a connection to the labour market (see Table 4), while the OECD 
figures do not.  Including them in the OECD figures would, for example, raise the share of 
households containing no one in employment to about 29% in Germany. 
25 This is consistent with the figure of 835,000 unemployed living in households with no connection 
to the labour market (Table 2), as nearly 60% of the 1.1 million households with no connection to   13
predominantly of white retired persons relying on private pensions or private 
incomes. It is the other 75% that are of concern and their sources of incomes are 
shown in Table 4 which only examines sources of incomes for African households 
with no labour market connection.  About 60% of these households receive the (non-
contributory means-tested old age) social pension, disability, or child maintenance 
grant (with the social pensions being by far the most important source);
26 another 7% 
receive a private pension or unemployment insurance.  For those households that 
receive none of these sources, the incomes are extremely low (only R104 or $35 per 
month per adult equivalent, putting them in the poorest decile), and include minimal 
agricultural incomes, some minor wage or self-employment income (for employment 
of less than 5 hours a week), some private income, or no incomes at all.
27 




Share  Mean Amount (R.)
Social Grants  502 60.0%  429
Private Pension  24 2.9%  586
Unemployment  Insurance  39 4.7%  551
Private Income  74 8.9%  300
Wage Income/Self-Emp.*  97 11.6%  526
Agriculture 284 34.0%  86
No Income  114 13.6%  0
Total w/o Wage or  Remittances  836 135.6%  417
Source: Saldru (1993). 
Note: Social grants consist primarily of social pensions, but also include disability and child maintenance grants.   The 
wage or self-employment income included here only includes workers working less than 5 hours a week; those were 
counted as unemployed in the analysis above.  The total share adds up to more than 100% as some households have 
access to more than one of the listed income sources.  In 1993, a $ was worth about 3.5 Rands so that average 
household incomes from these sources was about $115 a month.   
Thus the private safety net for the unemployed also includes state support in the form 
of old-age social pensions and other social grants paid out to household members 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the labour market contain no one who is employed, but also no one who is unemployed, that is, 
everyone is out of the labour force.  These households consist mostly, and in nearly equal absolute 
numbers each, of White and African pensioners living alone (suggesting, of course, that a much 
larger percentage of white than African pensioners live alone). 
26 In addition, many households which contain employed members also receive state support in the 
form of social pensions and disability grants.  All in all, 31% of the households containing at least 
one unemployed receive state support; equivalently, 34% of all unemployed live in households with 
state support.     
27 The minimal wage and self-employment income is included here as people working fewer than 5 
hours a week were not counted as employed.  The last group of households with no reported 
incomes did report expenditures which is either due to underreporting of incomes in the survey or 
the fact that these households indeed earn no incomes currently and are drawing down on assets 
they may have or incurring debt.  It is a small number and thus gives us some reassurance that the 
survey is tracking most income sources.   14
other than the unemployed.
28  But even this indirect public safety net does not stretch 
far enough to include everyone and leaves a significant portion of households in utter 
destitution.  
5. Unemployment and Household Formation: 
Evidence 
Knowing that most unemployed find themselves in households with some market and 
non-market resources obtained by other household members begs the question how 
this is achieved.  In this section, we investigate to what extent this is a result of 
explicit household formation strategies of the unemployed.     
In an exploratory analysis in Table 5, we have classified persons of working age 
according to their position in the household which we measure via their relationship 
to the household head.
29 If we hypothesise that unemployed persons are likely to 
attach themselves to another household to seek support we would not expect many 
unemployed to be household heads or spouses of the head but instead to be living 
with their parents or other relatives (and thus their relation to the household head 
would be child, sister, cousin, nephew, or niece of the household head).   
Table 5: Living Arrangements of Adult Individuals in 1995 (Relationship to 
Household Head) 





Head/Spouse 33.0 74.9 34.0  30.4 50.0
Kid<25 living with Parents  43.7 7.7 22.9  25.7 25.8
Kid>25 living with Parents  6.7 10.2 25.7  25.7 11.2
Living with Sibling   3.8 2.3 6.8  7.0 3.7
Living with Other Family  12.4 3.1 9.8  10.5 8.3
Living with Non Family  0.5 1.8 0.7  0.8 1.1
Total 100 100 100  100 100
Source: Stats SA (1995).  The most important categories among ‘other family’ are people living with uncles, aunts, and 
cousins.  The fairly high proportion of inactive adults living with other family is largely due to school and university 
age children living other family for school location reasons.   
                                                           
28 This is again in contrast to OECD countries.  While some 60-90% of households with working 
age members where no one is in employment rely on social transfers, most of these transfers consist 
of unemployment support to the unemployed household member (OECD 1998). 
29 In all the analysis of this section, we rely on the 1995 October Household Survey.  We replicated 
the analysis with the 1993 SALDRU survey and found very similar results.  For details, refer to 
Klasen and Woolard (1998).   15
We grouped all possible relationships to the household head into five groups: they are 
either the household head or his/her spouse (‘head/spouse’ in Table 5), they are 
children less than 25 years old living with their parents (‘kid<25’), children 25 or 
over living with their parents (‘kid>25’), people living with siblings, living with other 
family (for example, they are nephew, niece, cousin, parent, grandparents, uncle, 
aunt, or grandchildren of the household head) or non-family.   
Before proceeding to interpret the results, it is important to examine whether the 
definition of a household head is an exogenous category within a given household or 
is itself dependent on employment and income status of its members.  While we 
cannot examine this using these cross-sectional surveys, we can examine a two-wave 
panel from South Africa for 1993 and 1998, where the respondents in the 1993 
SALDRU survey from the most populous province, KwaZulu-Natal, were re-
interviewed in 1998 to see whether the household head changed within a given 
household configuration.  If we restrict our analysis to households where the head in 
1993 was resident and was still alive in 1998, 96% of household heads or spouses in 
1993 were still head or spouse in 1998, and the very few who were ‘demoted’ from 
headship had an average age of 67.  Thus the definition of headship seems very stable 
and we can treat it as a category that is exogenous to employment and earnings of 
individual members and thus can be seen to provide an accurate reflection of 
household formation patterns.
30     
The results of the table are striking.  75% of the employed are either household heads 
or the spouses of household heads, suggesting that employment ensures that people 
can set up independent households.  We compare this to the two types of 
unemployed, the strict and broad unemployed.  To investigate the difference between 
those two types of unemployed, we treat the two categories throughout the 
subsequent analysis as exclusive categories, that is, the broad unemployed only 
include those that are willing to work but have given up looking, and the narrow only 
those that want to work and are actively searching.  
In contrast to employed people, for the strictly (broadly) unemployed, the household 
position is very different.  Only 34% (30%) of them head households or are married 
to household heads, while a surprising 26% (26%) of them are children aged 25 or 
over still living with their parents.
31  Another 23% (26%) are children below 25 living 
with their parents, and 7% (7%) live with siblings, aunts, or cousins, and another 10% 
(11%) live with other family.  
                                                           
30 For a discussion of the concept of ‘household headship’ in South African surveys, see Budlender 
(1997). 
31 These figures are strikingly similar to the situation in today’s Mediterranean countries.  See 
Gallie and Paugam (2000).   16
Thus the unemployed appear to have a lower propensity to set up their own 
households; instead they stay with their parents, or move in with close (or more 
distant) relatives.  This is similar to the findings of Ellwood and Bane (1985) and 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993, 1994) which showed that less generous welfare 
payments led to a higher incidence of single mothers living with their parents.  We 
also find here that lack of support prevents the unemployed from setting up their own 
households.  This can then also explain the contrast between the distribution of 
unemployment among households in most rich countries and South Africa.  Support 
for the unemployed in rich countries allows households with no one in employment 
to persist and thus accounts for their high share; in South Africa, many of these 
households could not exist and the unemployed distribute themselves among 
household with access to private and public incomes.
32   
To investigate this issue further and place it in the context of the theoretical 
framework discussed in section 2, we specify a multinomial logit model predicting 
the likelihood of each relationship to the household head which, as discussed above, 
we believe gives an accurate reflection of household formation patterns.  We 
distinguish between various destination states including being household head or 
spouse of the household head (reference category), being a child living with his/her 
parents, living with other family and living with non-family.
33 
We restrict the sample to people in the labour force, thus excluding the inactives and 
use a dummy variable for the broadly unemployed to determine the effect of 
unemployment on household formation.
34  In line with the discussion in section 2, the 
regressions also control for age, education, race, and the scale-adjusted per capita 
income of the household one is located in.
35  The regressions are estimated separately 
for males and females.  Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in the model.  Using these regressions, we can then predict to what extent 
employment status affects the relationship to the household head and thus household 
formation. 
                                                           
32 To the extent that the unemployed young are not covered by unemployment insurance in some 
OECD countries, particularly in Southern Europe but also to some extent in the US and Canada, 
this can explain the delayed household formation of the young in these countries. See Card and 
Lemieux (2000) on the US and Canada and Gallie and Paugam (2000) for Southern Europe.   
33 Most of the regressions do not violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, as 
determined by a series of Hausman tests.  See notes below the tables.   
34 The relationship to the household head of the inactives is very much dependent on the reason for 
their inactivity (for example, whether it is due to formal education, domestic responsibilities, 
disability, or retirement).  
35 This is net of one’s own income to give a sense of how many additional resources one may be 
able to draw upon.  Since this variable is partly endogenous to the household formation process (in 
a one-person household that variable is by definition zero; but one-person households are quite rare 
in South Africa), we also specify specifications without this variable to see if it affects the other 
coefficients (which it does not to any significant extent).     17
This type of analysis examines only the end results of the link between employment 
and the relationship to household head and can say little about the process that 
created this outcome.  It is possible that unemployment prevented people from setting 
up their own household in the first place and thus they live longer with their parents 
than employed persons.  Alternatively, they may have moved back to their parents or 
relatives in response to unemployment.
36 We will investigate this issue further by 
examining information about migration in the survey and the results of a re-survey of 
part of the 1993 sample in 1998. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics Used in Regression 
 Males Females 
 Mean S.D. Mean  S.D.
African 0.64 0.48 0.68  0.47
Coloured 0.15 0.36 0.16  0.37
Indian 0.05 0.21 0.03  0.17
Pcnetinc 7.25 29.57 10.44  24.63
Unemployed 0.22 0.42 0.37  0.48
Age 36.40 11.06 34.71  10.53
Education 6.71 3.86 6.77  3.79
Note: Pcnetinc refers to the scale-adjusted per capita income of other household members, in thousands of Rands per 
year. 
Table 7 shows the results for the multinomial logit, separately for males and females.  
The results confirm some of the findings of the theoretical discussion.  In particular, 
age has the predicted effect of older people preferring to live on their own rather than 
in another household.  The influence of income is as expected; the higher the 
household income, the more attractive it is to be attached to such a household rather 
than setting up one’s own.
37  Education has a varying influence on household 
formation.  While higher education reduces the chance of living with one’s parents, it 
has no impact on living with other relatives or non-family, all compared to being 
household head or spouse.
38    
                                                           
36 There is also the (somewhat remote) possibility that unemployment simply leads to a renaming of 
the household head and thus the relationships to the household head.  For example, if the person of 
the younger generation becomes unemployed, household headship may move up to the parents. 
Qualitative evidence from South Africa suggests, however, that this is not a likely possibility.    
37 This finding should be treated with some caution as this variable, per capita net income of other 
household members, is partly endogenous to the household formation process (for example, if one 
moves out and lives alone, it will be zero).  This has no impact on the employment status variables, 
our main focus of interest.  If we drop the income variable, unemployment has an even (slightly) 
stronger impact of remaining in the parental household or staying with relatives.  These results are 
available upon request.   
38 There are also interesting racial differences in household formation patterns in Table 8 which we 
do not discuss here.    18
Table 7: Multinomial Logit Model of Relationship to Household Head (1995) 
   Males     Females   
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
T-Statistic Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
T-Statistic 
Child living with Parents  Child living with Parents 
African 1.42  0.13  11.36 African 1.47 0.11  13.54
Coloured 1.51  0.13  11.36 Coloured 1.71 0.12  13.77
Indian  1.31 0.15 8.92 Indian  1.29 0.16 8.24
Pcntinc 0.023  0.005  4.20 Pcntinc  -0.003 0.002  -1.37
Unemployed 2.47  0.07  35.87 Unemployed 0.88 0.06  15.70
Age -0.17  0.004  -41.35 Age -0.14 0.004  -39.08
Education 0.013  0.009  1.48 Education 0.052 0.008  6.55
Constant 2.66  0.19  14.18 Constant 1.81 1.17  10.48
Other Family (Siblings, Aunts, Uncles, Grandparents)  Other Family (Siblings, Aunts, Uncles, Grandparents) 
African  2.52 0.32 7.91 African  2.25 0.21  10.58
Coloured  2.50 0.32 7.80 Coloured  2.26 0.23 9.82
Indian  2.18 0.33 6.66 Indian  2.20 0.26 8.33
Pcntinc 0.025  0.006  4.18 Pcntinc 0.002 0.001  1.08
Unemployed 2.43  0.08  28.72 Unemployed 1.04 0.005  14.83
Age -0.14  0.005  -25.27 Age -0.10 0.005  -21.38
Education -0.01  0.01  -0.57 Education  0.01 0.01  1.1
Constant -0.43  0.37  -1.15 Constant -1.06 0.27  -3.93
Non-Family Non-Family 
African  1.26 0.55 2.27 African  0.59 0.34 1.71
Coloured  1.04 0.40 2.59 Coloured  0.90 0.34 2.65
Indian  0.06 0.48 0.13 Indian  -1.26 1.03  -1.22
Pcntinc 0.026  0.007  4.01 Pcntinc 0.006 0.001  5.34
Unemployed  0.45 0.39 1.17 Unemployed -0.68 0.25  -6.16
Age -0.07  0.02  -3.84 Age -0.08 0.01  -2.73
Education -0.05  0.02  -2.12 Education -0.05 0.03  -1.39
Constant -2.07  0.85  -2.45 Constant -1.26 -1.26  -1.26
N   22985    N  19524  
F (21, 2883)= 156.65 (Prob>F = 0.00)  F(21, 2789) = 124.02 (Prob>F=0.00) 
Note: The standard errors take account of the clustered nature of the sample.  Hausman tests were performed to test for the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives-hypothesis and the results mostly failed to reject the IIA hypothesis.  In the two cases where 
the hypothesis was rejected, inspection of the test results show nearly identical coefficients on our unemployment covariate in the 
full and the reduced model so that this rejection of the IIA hypothesis does not materially question the results of the analysis.      
 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is particularly important to see that being 
(broadly) unemployed significantly reduces the chance of being a household head or 
spouse.
39  For males, the impact of this variable is very large and very precisely 
determined leading to very high significance levels, particularly with regard to 
remaining in the parental household or the household of relatives.  Thus the results 
from the cross-tabulations in Table 5 carry over to the multivariate context.   
Unemployment either prevents the setting up of a household or leads the unemployed 
to attach themselves to other households in search of support.   These results still hold 
even if we control for additional variables such as marital status or household size 
                                                           
39 Considering only the narrowly unemployed, or both separately, leads to very similar results.  See 
also discussion below.     19
and becomes even larger if we drop the possibly endogenous income variable.
40  For 
females, the impact of unemployment on household formation is somewhat more 
muted, presumably due to the fact that it is easier for an unemployed female to be the 
spouse of a household head than for an unemployed male to be household head, a 
finding that is also true elsewhere, see Gartner (2000).  But the same household 
formation effects are still present. 
This importance of the link between unemployment and household formation is 
shown in some simulations in Table 8.  We compare the simulated effects of being 
employed, differentiating between African and whites, and being unemployed on 
household formation.  Ceteris paribus, the switch from being employed to being 
unemployed reduces the chance of being household head or spouse by about 30 
percentage points, which is considerably larger than all other effects in the regression, 
including the large racial differences in household structure.  Instead, the unemployed 
have a much higher propensity of living with their parents, although living with other 
family is also considerably more likely for them.  The simulated effects are, in line 
with findings from Table 7, smaller for women.   
To what extent is this result driven by active migration in response to unemployment, 
or is it the failure of young unemployed people to leave the home of parents or 
relatives that is driving the results?  The OHS contains information on recent 
migration (last 12 months) and birthplace migration, but unfortunately does not state 
reasons for the migration.
41  The birthplace migration information yields three distinct 
patterns of migration as shown in Table 9.   Among those who are in employment, 
nearly half have moved as shown in the second to last row.  Of those who have 
moved, over 90% of the employed became (or remained) household heads or spouse; 
very few employed moved in with their parents or other family.   The second pattern 
is that among the unemployed, the propensity to move is much smaller.  Only 20-
25% of each group has moved.  The vast majority who have not moved remained in 
their parental household or in a household of other relatives.  Thus unemployment is 
a powerful force for persistence in the parental family.  This persistence generates 
considerable regional immobility as the children remain tied to their parental location 
which, in the South African context, often involves a location in rural areas and/or the 
                                                           
40 Since marital status and household size are endogenous variables that are themselves influenced 
by employment status, it is not appropriate to treat them as exogenous regressors.  The fact that 
their inclusion still generates significant results for the unemployment variables suggests that plenty 
of unemployed married people still live with their parents or with other relatives, and that marriage 
and setting up a household are far from synonymous in South Africa.  The regressions are available 
on request.      
41 Note that birthplace migration is an imperfect proxy of migration in response to labour market 
events.  Firstly, if people stayed in the same town but changed household, this will not be captured.  
Secondly, migration could have taken place for other reasons.  If children moved with their parents, 
we assume that this is not of relevance for our analysis as the children did not change household 
and thus we treat them as if they had not moved.     20
former homelands.  Thirdly, of those few unemployed that have moved, most are 
household heads or spouses though more than half of these are women who formed 
households with a male partner rather than male heads of households.
42  In addition, a 
significant minority of other unemployed who have moved have attached themselves 
to households of relatives and non-family, presumably in search of support, and some 
seem to have returned to parental households. Thus this information suggests that the 
predominant household formation response to unemployment involves staying with 
parents or other relatives, while a considerable minority react to unemployment by 
attaching themselves to the household of relatives and non-family, and some return to 
their parents.
43   
Table 8: Predictions of Household Status 
 Head/Spouse Child Other  Family  Non-Family
Male  
Employed 65.1% 25.3% 7.9%  1.7%
Employed African  62.6% 26.5% 8.9%  2.0%
Employed white  80.2% 17,1% 1.8%  0.9%
Unemployed 38.6% 45.4% 14.9%  1.1%
Unemployed African  34.7% 46.8% 17.2%  1.2%
Unemployed white  59.2% 35.9% 4.0%  0.8%
Female  
Employed 60.2% 28.9% 9.8%  1.1%
Employed African  57.9% 30.2% 10.8%  1.1%
Employed white  81.7% 15.0% 2.2%  1.0%
Unemployed 51.1% 35.2% 13.2%  0.5%
Unemployed African  48.2% 36.6% 14.8%  0.5%
Unemployed white  76.2% 20.0% 3.3%  0.6%
Note: The table is based on predictions using the results from Table 7. 
 
In the appendix we expand the multinominal logit model for males to distinguish 
within each category (head/spouse, kid, other family, non-family) between those who 
have moved from the town of their birth and those who remained (see appendix 
Tables 1, 2).  Those in employment are much more likely to be head of the 
households and much more likely to have moved than to have stayed.  Employment 
thus is highly associated with headship and with moving.  In contrast, the 
predominant response to unemployment is staying with one’s parents or other 
                                                           
42 Since this refers to birthplace migration, some of these moves might have taken place before the 
current spell of unemployment and might be related to previous spells of employment.   
43 While this is the most likely interpretation of the table, it is also possible that some of the 
unemployed who live as children could have returned to the parental home (and not be regarded as 
having migrated since their current place of residence is their place of birth) and also some might 
have moved with other family or non-family.  Given the close correlation with employment status, 
the interpretation advanced above seems much more plausible.     21
relatives, while a significant minority move to join family and non-family, and some 
return to their parents. 
Table 9: Birthplace Migration by Employment Status 
  Employed  Broad Unemployed  Narrow Unemployed 
 Stayed Moved Stayed Moved Stayed Moved
Head/Spouse  58.2 91.4 24.6 67.4 20.0 62.7
  38.7 61.3 56.7 43.3 49.7 50.3
Child  34.5 1.5 60.5 7.2 66.0 6.0
  95.8 4.2 96.8 3.2 97.1 2.9
Other Family  6.2  4.6 14.4 24.3 13.5  29.8
  57.1 42.9 68.0 32.0 58.4 41.6
Non-Family  1.0 2.5 0.6 1.2 0.5 1.5
  28.4 71.6 64.2 35.8 50.8 49.2
Total  Column  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share  Row  49.7 50.3 78.2 21.8 75.6 24.4
Observations 15700  15868 5268 1470 4673  1509
Note: Observations are weighted to mirror population distribution.  The figures in italics refer to the share of people 
within each row and category (for example, employed) that stayed or moved.  
The Africans included in the 1993 SALDRU survey from the most populous 
province, KwaZulu-Natal, containing some 20% of all Africans in that survey, were 
resurveyed in 1998.  This allows us to see whether the employment status in the two 
periods has had an impact on changes in household formation, thus enabling us to 
study the dynamics of household formation behaviour.
44  Table 3 in the appendix 
shows the results.  Those who were employed in both periods were much more likely 
to remain head of household or set up their own household, while those who 
remained unemployed or had become unemployed predominantly remained with their 
parents.
45  A small share returned to their parents in search of support and a much 
larger share of those that became unemployed remained or became attached to 
households headed by other family.  This also supports the finding that the largest 
household formation response to unemployment is to remain in the parental house 
while a significant minority adapt by attaching themselves to households of other 
family.    
Household formation responses of the unemployed thus strongly influence the 
household and locational pattern of unemployment.  Unemployment in many cases 
precludes the maintenance of an independent household and thus leads the 
                                                           
44 With the 1998 resurvey, we have another data point on employment status and household 
formation, but only limited information on developments in-between.   
45 To be sure this finding does not contradict the finding that household headship is a largely 
exogenous category as we have shown earlier.  The people who have become head between 1993 
and 1998 have done so because the household head from 1993 is no longer there ((s)he has died or 
moved away) or they have founded a new household.       22
unemployed to seek support in other households.  This happens predominantly by 
staying in one’s parent’s home or moving back to parents and relatives in response to 
unemployment.  Employment, on the other hand, allows the creation of a new and 
independent household, often in a different location.   
This can partly explain the puzzle of high rural unemployment.
46  An unemployed 
person stays in, or moves to rural areas primarily for the economic support he or she 
can get there, rather than the (very limited) labour market opportunities.
47  Potential 
economic support for the unemployed is particularly high in rural areas, especially in 
the former homelands, as apartheid residential policies ensured that most families 
were forced to take up residence there and since the social pensions paid to the 
elderly, who live predominantly in those areas, now provide considerable public 
support for remaining there.  This draws many unemployed away from most 
employment opportunities and may thus provide a disincentive to search and find 
employment.  This issue is investigated in the next section.
48   
 
                                                           
46 See also Klasen and Woolard (1998) for other reasons for high rural unemployment in South 
Africa.  The arguments presented here may be further reinforced by cost differences between urban 
and rural areas.  While the cost differences between urban and rural areas for people with 
established households in either location are remarkably small (largely due to subsidised housing 
costs and/or rent and service boycotts in urban areas as well as high transport costs in rural areas, 
see Klasen, 2002), it is quite costly to establish a new household in urban areas which further raises 
the barrier to accessing the urban labour market and contribute to rural unemployment.   
47 In an earlier analysis, we distinguished in our multinomial logit analysis between rural and urban 
destinations, that is, whether a person chose to live with relatives in rural or urban areas, and also 
distinguished between narrow and broad unemployed.  There we found that the there is a 
correlation between higher education, narrow unemployment, and household formation in urban 
areas (many with relatives and non-family), and conversely a correlation with lower education, 
broad unemployment and rural location.  While several factors could account for this correlation, 
this might be particularly suggestive of the unemployed sorting themselves into two groups with 
those with better labour market prospects going to urban areas and actively searching while those 
with worse prospects remaining in rural areas and stopping to search.    
48 One might still claim that given the presence of many unemployed in rural areas, flexible rural 
labour markets should ensure that wages adjust accordingly and they should then be employed there 
nevertheless.  But several reasons might militate against this.  Firstly, rural labour markets may be 
segmented in the sense that labour demand is very low in the areas where most unemployed reside, 
so that market clearing wages would be far too low for the unemployed to make their employment 
worthwhile.  Similarly, access to productive assets is so limited as to reduce the potential for self-
employment or farm activities.  See Klasen and Woolard (1998) for a discussion.      23
6. The Consequences of Household Formation 
Decisions of the Unemployed 
The analysis so far has suggested that location decisions of the unemployed are 
heavily influenced by the availability of economic support and may therefore lead 
them away from places where it is profitable to search for employment.   In this 
section we want to examine two consequences of this household formation behaviour.  
The first is to investigate the impact of this behaviour on the welfare of the 
unemployed and the welfare of households hosting them.  As already mentioned in 
section 4, this private safety net that operates via household formation does not work 
for everyone.  While most unemployed are able to get access to resources this way, 
the amount of resources varies greatly and some face utter destitution.  Thus this 
private safety net generates considerable risks for those who have to rely on it.   
In addition, those who are the providers of the safety net also have to shoulder a 
considerable burden for their willingness to support the unemployed.  This is shown 
in Table 10 which shows a simple regression of annual household income per adult 
equivalent among Africans, using the 1995 Income and Expenditure Survey.  Adding 
an unemployed member to a household reduces adult equivalent expenditures by over 
R1600 (over R500 reduction for adding one more person based on household size, 
and nearly R1100 reduction for that person being unemployed).   If the household 
hosting the unemployed is in rural areas and headed by someone with poor education, 
having an average household size (5 people), two of whom are unemployed, this will, 
on average, place that household far below the poverty line, which stood at about 
R3000 annual income per person in 1995.  As a result, there is a close correlation 
between hosting unemployed people and poverty.  In 1995 some 65% of the broad 
and 59% of the narrow unemployed found themselves in households situated in the 
poorest two quintiles (defined by adult equivalent expenditures).  Fifty-one % of the 
people in the poorest quintile live in households where no one is employed and only 
17% of the working age population in the lowest quintile actually have a job.   
With rising joblessness in the 1990s, this burden of unemployment on households is 
increasing in South Africa.  As unemployment is rising, so is the number of 
unemployed people relying on other household members for their resources.  This is 
shown in Table 11 which shows that the share of households that contain one or more 
unemployed has risen from 30% to over 35% of all households between 1993 and 
1997.  While the total number of households has increased by some 9%, the number 
of household having to support four or more unemployed has risen by about 50%.  
Further support for the importance of the importance of this comes from Woolard and 
Klasen (2005) who use the KIDS panel survey and the addition of unemployed 
members is one of the most important predictors of changes in poverty status between 
1993 and 1998.     24
Thus the private safety net ensures basic survival for most unemployed but this 
system drags the households providing the support into poverty.  In addition, rising 
joblessness increases the strain on this private safety net considerably.  More and 
more people are involuntarily crowded into households and have to share the 
resources available. 
Table 10: Unemployment and Poverty among Africans (1995) 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  T-Statistic 
Education Spline       
    No education  -786.6  112.3  -7.0 
    Primary  -145.9  86.8  -1.7 
    Some Secondary  547.3  103.2  5.3 
    Comp. Secondary  2022.7  279.0  7.2 
    Some Tertiary  2614.1  497.8  5.3 
Household Size  -577.1  55.1  -10.5 
Urban 3673.6  296.9  12.4 
Number of 
Unemployed 
-1080.4 99.9  -10.8 
Constant 9398.1  310.9  30.2 
Note: The dependent variable is annual adult equivalent income of Africans in 1995.  The standard errors are adjusted 
to take into account the clustered nature of the sample.  The education variables refer to the average education level of 
everyone in the household who is older than 16. It is included as a spline which means that the effect of tertiary 
education can be computed by adding the effects for none, primary, secondary, completed secondary, and tertiary. 
Table 11: Unemployed Persons and Household Structure, 1993 and 1997 
   Number of unemployed   
   0 1  2  3  4+  Total 
1993 Amount  5931252  1722953  573793 193476  98981  8520455 
  Share  69.6 20.2 6.7 2.3 1.2  100 
1997 Amount  5956836 2136267 776293 239112 148199 9256707 
  Share  64.3 23.1 8.4 2.6 1.6  100 
     Increase Percentage  0.4%  24.0%  35.3%  23.6%  49.7%  8.6% 
Source: Saldru (1993) and Stats SA (1997). 
 
Another consequence of the location decision of the unemployed is the potential 
impact on search behaviour.  Since labour market decisions are often influenced by 
other household members, we examine participation and search decisions as well as 
employment prospects at the household level.
49  In particular, we estimate a model 
predicting participation in the labour force, search activities, and employment 
prospects based on income sources of the household and other labour market 
                                                           
49 We also examined this using a person-level analysis trying to predict which broadly unemployed 
decide to search.  The results suggest that poorly educated Africans in rural areas are least likely to 
search, confirming that being ‘stuck’ in rural areas significantly reduces employment prospects.  
The results are available on request.   25
characteristics.  The first regression could indicate to what extent households rely on 
the labour market for resources, the second gives an impression of the influences on 
search costs for the unemployed, and the third should shed some light on the ability 
to get employment offers and on the willingness to accept such offers.  
Since we specify the model at the household level, we try to predict the share of 
adults in a household who report to be in the broad labour force (regression 1 in 
Table 12), the share of those in the broad labour force who are also in the narrow 
labour force (employed or searching, regression 2), and the share of those in the 
narrow labour force who are employed (regression 3), respectively.   Since the 
causality between remittance income and labour market behaviour may run in both 
directions (that is, household may receive remittance income because they have no 
one employed), we have used the existence of an absent members of a household as 
an instrument for remittance income and estimate the model using Two Stage Least 
Squares.
50   
Table 12: Labour Force Participation, Searching, and Employment of 
Households (African and Coloureds)
51 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent  Share of Adults in 
Labour Force 
Share Narrow/ Broad 
LF* 
Share Employed / 
Narrow LF** 
Remittance Amount  -0.0008 (-13.8)  -0.001 (-12.5)  -0.0006  (-6.9) 
Coloured  0.028    (1.9)  0.115   (6.9)  0.008     (0.5) 
Urban  0.071    (6.2)  0.048   (3.6)  -0.01    (-0.9) 
Metropolitan  0.084    (6.8)  0.052   (3.8)  -0.064   (-5.5) 
Age  0.034    (10.7)  -0.006   (-1.3)  0.0009    (0.2) 
Age
2  -0.0004 (-9.4)  0.0001 (1.9)  -0.00004 (0.6) 
Avg. Education  0.002    (1.6)  0.011  (6.0)  0.0083   (5.2) 
Share Female  -0.173   (-13.8)  -0.049   (-2.7)  0.003     (0.2) 
Pension Income  -0.00025 (-9.8)  -0.0005 (-14.8)  -0.0003  (-8.7) 
Private Income  -0.0002  (-4.2)  -0.0001 (-1.6)  -0.0001  (-2.1) 
Constant  0.93   (1.6)  0.86    (11.2)  0.81     (11.7) 
R
2 0.15  0.04  0.03 
Notes:  * refers to the share of adults in a household in the broad labour force who are also in the narrow labour force 
(that is, working or searching).  ** refers to the share of adults in a household in the narrow labour force who are 
employed.  t-statistics in parentheses.  Age refers to the average age of the adult members of the household. 
                                                           
50 As a benchmark, we ran Ordinary Least Squares regressions using the same variables (and 
without the instrument).  The coefficients do not differ much from the OLS regressions.  The 
instrument passes tests for relevance (it significantly influences the remittance variable proxied for) 
and exogeneity (in the sense that it does not influence the dependent variable, except through its 
influence on remittances). 
51 Indians and Whites were dropped since the focus is on the groups with high unemployment rates.  
Including them would not change the results.   26
Table 12 shows the results. Age, education, gender, and location have the expected 
signs and are all significant.  Remittance income is negatively correlated with labour 
force participation, search activities, and employment prospects.  Similarly, pension 
and non-wage private income in the household are also correlated with lower labour 
force participation, search activities, and employment prospects of the adult 
household members.  This effect is the strongest in the second regression suggesting 
that these income sources have the strongest impact on reducing search activities.  
Since some 31% of all household containing unemployed people receive such state 
support, this finding should be of some concern to policy-makers.
52   
These findings could either mean that remittance, pension and non-wage private 
income provide a direct disincentive by raising the reservation wage.
 53 Alternatively, 
they could mean that unemployed people attach themselves to households with 
pension or remittance income, which might reduce search activities and employment 
prospects if the household receiving pensions and remittances is in rural areas.
54  This 
could be due to high search costs there which reduce search activities or due to low 
employment prospects which would lower employment rates.  Given the discussion 
above on the endogeneity of household formation, this latter interpretation is more 
likely and does indeed suggest a pattern of household formation that takes some 
unemployed people away from job prospects and into households with pensions and 
remittances in rural areas which then causes them do cease searching.
55  
                                                           
52 Similarly, some 35% of the unemployed live in households which receive state support. 
53 It should, however, be pointed out that pension income is likely to have fewer disincentive effects 
than other forms of support to the unemployed (such as direct unemployment benefits) as the 
pension income of an elderly member of the household will not be reduced when an adult member 
of the household finds employment.  Bertrand et al. (2003) do, however, suggest that there might be 
small disincentive effects associated with pension receipt, although this finding is controversial (see 
Posel et al. 2004).   
54 The negative coefficients on household incomes do not mean that these forms of income serve to 
increase unemployment.  In fact, to the extent that pension, private, and remittance income reduces 
labour force participation, it contributes to lowering the unemployment rate as it reduces labour 
supply and relieves pressure on the labour market; the negative coefficient in regression 3 also says 
nothing about influence on the unemployment rate but only says something about who among the 
narrow labour force is likely to get employment.  Only to the extent that other household income 
(such as pension income) reduces search activities and employment of adult members of 
households, may it contribute to increasing the unemployment rate by raising reservation wages and 
by increasing rigidities in the labour market. An alternative interpretation could be that those with 
other forms of income are searching less actively and thereby are less successful in securing 
employment. 
55 Table 12 also supports our earlier contention about the two groups of unemployed in the 
following two ways.  Firstly, the high and significant coefficient on education and on urban and 
metropolitan areas in regression (2) supports the finding that there are two groups of unemployed.  
Those with better job prospects (for which education may be a good proxy) are more likely to go to 
urban areas, attach themselves to relatives and search, while those with worse job prospects fall 
back to rural areas and do not search.  Secondly, regression (3) shows that employment prospects 
are indeed worse for those with lower education, and for those who have other income sources   27
Table 13: Determinants of Reservation Wages 1993 
 OLS     Heckman     Select    
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
T-Ratio Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T-Ratio Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
T-Ratio 
Remittances -0.32 0.17 -1.87 -0.34  0.21 -1.58       
Wage  Income  0.14 0.07 2.11 0.15  0.04 3.30       
Private  Income  0.39 0.14 2.75 0.39  0.14 2.85       
State  Income  -0.03 0.02 -1.91 -0.04  0.05 -0.76       
Ag.  Income -2.73 1.34 -2.03 -2.26  1.43 -1.58       
Self-Emp.  Inc.  0.66 0.20 3.32 0.62  0.14 4.57       
old TBVC  -51.07  99.23  -0.52  -10.28  48.89  -0.21  -0.01  0.06  -0.26 
old SGT  -87.04  63.13  -1.38  -81.53  37.10  -2.20  0.14  0.05  3.05 
Coloured -165.76  53.12  -3.12  -179.63  48.73  -3.69 0.07  0.05  1.39 
Indian 31.57  89.02  0.36  36.32  85.92  0.42  -0.07  0.09  -0.78 
white 104.72  136.30  0.77  153.84  83.66  1.84  -0.37  0.06  -5.92 
Everwork -48.60  33.87  -1.44  -47.71  30.61  -1.56       
Female -209.26  30.47  -6.87  -205.69  28.86  -7.13  -0.08  0.03  -2.46 
Age 23.20  7.96  2.92  23.33  9.13  2.56  0.02  0.01  2.27 
Age  Squared  -0.26 0.11 -2.43 -0.23  0.12 -1.84  0.00  0.00 -3.08 
Kids 85.01  39.66  2.14  91.10  36.40  2.50  -0.21  0.03  -6.22 
Married 34.90  41.02  0.85  56.93  35.35  1.61  0.08  0.04  2.08 
Education 31.48  6.07  5.19  33.31  4.72  7.06 -0.02  0.00  -3.46 
Unemployment Rate            0.95  0.11  8.50 
Urban          0.43  0.04  10.24 
Constant      546.27  171.48  3.19  -1.88  0.21  -8.97 
N 13159                 
Rho      -0.29  0.09       
Sigma      563.64  16.79       
Lambda      -165.32  55.86       
R-Sq. 0.14                 
Likelihood Ratio Test (Pr rho=0)  0.0077           
Source: In the OLS regression, the standard errors are adjusted to take into account the clustered sampling of the 
survey. 
 
We also examine the determinants of reservation wages of the unemployed to 
examine whether pension and private incomes constitute a direct disincentive to 
search by raising the reservation wage.  Table 13 shows the results of the regressions 
for monthly reservation wages, based on the 1993 SALDRU survey.
56  We use the 
Heckman correction for this regression to address the sample selection bias of the 
reservation wage equation. We use a worker-specific (by province, age, gender, and 
education group of the worker)
57 local unemployment rate and urban location as 
identifying variables for the selection equation.  Although the regression coefficients 
do not differ greatly between the OLS and the Heckman regression, the Likelihood 
Ratio test indicates that selectivity is indeed a problem so that it was right to address 
the potential selectivity issue.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
which may suggest that those who attach themselves to other households with pension or other 
income correctly perceive their lower employment prospects. 
56 Unfortunately, OHS 1995 did not ask this question. 
57 Each worker was assigned an unemployment rate which was the unemployment rate prevailing 
among the same age, education, gender, and province group to which the worker belongs    28
While province, race, gender, age, and education have large and significant impact on 
the reservation wages (as one would expect), pension and remittance incomes do not 
appear to raise reservation wages.  Only self-employment income and private income 
is associated with higher reservation wages.  Thus we find little evidence of a direct 
disincentive effect of pension and remittance income on search activities and 
employment prospects through higher reservation wages.
58 
This provides further confirmation that the linkages between pension and remittance 
income and search and employment prospects operates via changes in household 
formation rather than directly via an increase in the reservation wage.  The 
unemployed get stuck in rural households in order to get support from pensions and 
remittances and thereby reduce their search and employment prospects.  The direct 
impact of household income on search and employment prospects, operating via an 
increase in the reservation wage, does not appear to be of significant magnitude (and 
may not exist at all).  
7. Conclusion 
We started out by posing a question about the factors that can explain the persistence 
of high unemployment in rural areas in a situation of flexible labour markets and no 
significant unemployment insurance. 
We were able to show that the unemployed are dispersed widely among South 
African households ensuring that most of the unemployed have access to employment 
income or state transfers received by other household members.  While this insures 
some resource access, this private safety net does not cover everyone.  Moreover, it 
drags many of the households supporting unemployed people into poverty and 
involuntarily increases household sizes, with negative consequences for the welfare 
of receiving households. 
One interesting policy issue emerges immediately from this.  If South Africa 
succeeded in substantially reducing unemployment, this would then lead to many of 
the previously unemployed seeking to set up independent households which, in turn, 
would drastically increase the demand for housing and associated municipal services.  
The current strain on the private safety system would make way for strain on the 
housing market and municipal services. 
                                                           
58 We know of no other study that has examined the impact of pensions on reservation wages; given 
the importance of the issue, the policy debates on the effects of pensions may take note of this 
finding.   29
The mechanism allowing for the wide dispersion of the unemployed is through 
adjustments in the household boundaries.  Unemployed people never get to be 
household heads or spouse (or cease to be household head) and stay in (or move to) 
households of parents of relatives.  The information on migration and a resurvey on 
part of the sample suggest that this response operates mainly via staying in the 
parental household, thus reducing labour market mobility considerably.  Given that 
many of these households are in rural areas, and are being sustained by pensions and 
remittances, unemployed persons (most likely the less educated and less employable 
ones) will remain in (or move to) rural areas to draw on these resources which 
thereby reduces their search activities and employment prospects.  This prolongs their 
unemployment spells and leads to the emergence of rural unemployment which is not 
related to rural labour markets but simply to the location decisions of the 
unemployed.  While social pensions and other state support thus are able to support 
the unemployed (among other poor people, see Deaton and Case, 1998), they appear 
to contribute to lower labour market mobility and may, from that perspective, be 
inferior to direct support to the unemployed person, wherever they are.
59   
At the same time, we find no evidence of a direct disincentive effect of household 
income on reservation wages which supports our contention that the reduced search 
activity of households receiving pension and remittance income is a result of the 
location decision of the unemployed. 
Several important policy conclusions emerge from these findings.  Firstly, 
unemployment can persist at very high levels even in the absence of unemployment 
support.  Secondly, a private safety net can, in theory, partly replace public support 
for the unemployed.  But this private safety net does not cover everyone and leaves 
some unemployed and their dependants in utter destitution.  Moreover, it drags many 
households supporting the unemployed into poverty.  In the South African case, it 
heavily depends on the existence of state transfers to pensioners which indirectly 
supports the unemployed.   
Thirdly, reliance on a private safety net can generate disincentive effects that can 
prolong unemployment.  In particular, it forces the unemployed to base their location 
decisions on the availability of economic support rather than on the best location for 
employment search.  In the South African case, where a lot of economic support 
(especially the social pensions)
60 is based in rural areas, this leads to low labour 
market mobility, reduces search activities (since there are few prospects of 
                                                           
59 At the same time, there are other advantages to the social pensions as support for the 
unemployed, compared to unemployment insurance.  In particular, they provide no direct 
disincentive effect.  See also Case and Deaton (1997). 
60 As a legacy of apartheid-era restrictions on mobility, the policy to force the economically inactive 
into the homelands, and the high costs of living in urban areas, most of the elderly reside in rural 
areas.   30
employment) and thus prolongs unemployment.
61  In order to remedy the situation, 
financial support for search and relocation to unemployed youth might be one way to 
help overcome this particular immobility.  Alternatively, facilitating the move of 
pension recipients to urban areas (through for example, provision of urban amenities 
for such population groups) might also ensure that those that depend on it would also 
be able to move closer to promising labour market opportunities.  
Thus we are faced with a rather counterintuitive overall conclusion: the absence of 
unemployment support may not only lower the welfare of many of the unemployed 
and those they depend on, it may also not do much to reduce unemployment duration, 
and the regional immobility it engenders might actually increase it.  The debates 
about incentive effects of unemployment support in other developing or industrialised 
countries may want to take note of this finding.     
 
 
                                                           
61 Similar arguments have been advanced for explaining high unemployment and low regional 
mobility among the young in Spain (Bentolila and Ichino, 2000).   31
Appendix 
Table 1: Logit Prediction Relationship to Household Head and Migration 
Status, Males (1995) 
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 




African -0.92 0.09  -10.22 African  1.69 0.48  3.51
Coloured -1.34 0.11  -12.13 Coloured  1.13 0.50  2.29
Indian -0.99 0.18  -5.67 Indian  1.34 0.48  2.80
Pcntinc 0.002 0.003  0.67 Pcntinc 0.027 0.008  3.63
Unemployed -0.50 0.08 -6.33 Unemployed 2.08 .12  17.26
Age 0.007 0.002  2.80 Age  -0.119 0.007  -16.26
Education 0.05 0.008  5.70 Education  0.019 0.017  1.12
Constant 0.69 0.165  4.15 Constant  -0.27 0.56  -0.47
Kidstay NonFamilyStay 
African 0.79 0.14  5.55 African 1.04 0.95  1.09
Coloured 0.68 0.15  4.57 Coloured 1.56 0.88  1.77
Indian 0.63 0.19  3.36 Indian  -0.26 1.00  -0.26
Pcntinc 0.025 0.007  3.63 Pcntinc 0.029 0.007  4.00
Unemployed 2.24 0.08  29.45 Unemployed 0.96 0.37  2.57
Age -0.17 0.004  -39.43 Age -0.12 0.02  -5.45
Education 0.04 0.01  3.82 Education  -0.01 0.05  -0.26
Constant 3.81 0.21  18.25 Constant  -1.12 1.32  -0.85
Kidmove NonFamilyMove 
African 0.39 0.34  1.13 African 0.47 0.60  0.77 
Coloured 0.07 0.40  0.18 Coloured  -0.89 0.50  -1.80
Indian 0.41 0.46  0.88 Indian  -0.76 0.57  -1.33
Pcntinc 0.023 0.007  3.32 Pcntinc 0.027 0.008  3.33
Unemployed 2.06 0.19  10.91 Unemployed -0.29 0.50  -0.57
Age -0.19 0.014  -13.52 Age -0.04 0.016  -2.78
Education 0.029 0.027  1.11 Education  -0.031 0.028  -1.08
Constant 1.73 0.51  3.41 Constant  -1.64 0.81  -2.02
OtherFamilyStay    
African 2.02 0.38  5.26    
Coloured 1.99 0.39  5.12 N  22985  
Indian  1.61 0.41  3.89 F (49, 2855) 73.76  
Pcntinc 0.024 0.007  3.62 Prob>F  0.00  
Unemployed 2.27 0.10  22.17    
Age -0.14 0.007  -21.72    
Education 0.017 0.014  1.27    
Constant 0.38 0.45  0.86    
Note: The Hausman test for the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption was passed in the all cases.   
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Table 2: Predicting Household Structure, Males. 
  Employed All  Employed Africans  Unemployed 
 Africans 
HeadStay 26.2% 26.7% 18.7%
HeadMove 38.9% 35.9% 16.0%
ChildStay 24.4% 25.6% 45.5%
ChildMove 0.9% 1.0% 1.4%
OtherFamStay 4.7% 5.1% 10.0%
OtherFamMove 3.1% 3.7% 7.2%
NonFamStay 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
NonFamMove 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Note: Simulations are based on regression in Appendix Table 1.  Results for females are available on request.   
 
Table 3: Changes in Household Formation and Employment Status among 













Remain Head/Spouse  11.1  10.2 1.7 10.2 26.7  30.8
Become Head/Spouse  50.1  15.3 5.2 9.9 9.8  17.8
Stay with Parents  26.7  44.8 62.6 46.6 29.7  26.4
Move to Parents  0.9  1.7 2.0 1.1 1.8  0.7
Remain with Other Family  7.5  17.2 16.5 22.3 19.2  14.4
Go to Other Family  3.4  10.6 12.1 9.3 12.1  9.3
Remain with Non-Family  0.3  0.2 0.0 0.8 0.7  0.7
Go to Non-Family  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1  0.0
Cases 585  587 406 668 705  292
Source: own analysis based on SALDRU and KIDS household surveys.   33
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